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I. DIGEST OF SELECTED BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND DOCUMENTS

LA BATAILLE DE LA MARNE A-T-ELLE ÉTÉ ENGAGÉE 24 HEURES TROP TÔT?—(WAS THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE BEGUN 24 HOURS TOO SOON?)

By Robert Duche.—*Revue Militaire Française*, 1 June, 1925, p. 385; 1 July, 1925, p. 6. 34 pages, 1 map (sketch).

The author of this article (whose military experience, if any, does not appear), takes as a premise an article in *Le Temps* of 22 December, 1922, written by General Malleterre, entitled, "Was the Battle of the Marne begun a day too soon?"

The gist of the author's conclusions is that the advance (on 5 September, 1914) of Manoury's Sixth French Army was begun twenty-four hours too soon, for it alarmed von Kluck, and caused him so to dispose his First German Army as to avert a crushing defeat in the ensuing Battle of the Marne; that if the Allied general offensive had been launched on 7 September instead of 6 September, *i.e.*, if the enveloping maneuver of the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force had been withheld until 7 September, a far greater victory would have been achieved; and so, the question of the most favorable moment being a matter of hours rather than of days, that the Battle of the Marne, as well as the Battle of the Ourcq, was begun twenty-four hours too soon.

General Malleterre, according to the author, referred to an assertion that the beginning of the Allied general offensive on 6 September, 1914, was premature; and, taking the opposite view, set out to prove three particular points in support of his opinion. These were:

1. That von Kluck ordered the retrograde movement of his right for 6 September, not to ward off an anticipated attack on his rear by the Sixth French Army, but in compliance with orders from the German General Headquarters.

2. That if the Sixth French Army had not attacked until 7 September, it would have been confronted not only by the IV Reserve Corps, but also by the II and IV Corps of von Kluck's army.

3. That from the viewpoint of the French High Command, the situation rendered the launching of its general offensive on 6 September a matter of necessity rather than of choice.

The author discusses these points *seriatim*, his main sources of information being "the orders given and executed," the books of von Kluck, von Bülow and Gallieni, and certain articles in previous numbers of the *Revue Militaire Française*.

Beginning his study with 4 September, he shows that von Moltke and von Kluck had different conceptions of the mission of the First German Army during the days just preceding the launching of the Allied general offensive. Von Moltke considered the First Army to have a purely defensive mission—"to assure the protection of the (right) flank of the armies"; whereas von Kluck's conception was that his army was to have the principal part in "the projected driving of the enemy from Paris towards the southeast." Thus it was that during the night of 2-3 September von Moltke directed that "the First Army follows the Second Army *en echelon*, and continues to assure the protection of the flank of the armies"; while, in response to these orders, von Kluck, during the afternoon of 4 September, reported to General Headquarters that the projected maneuver "could succeed only if the First Army moves in advance." In consonance with the idea of an envelopment of the Allied left by the First Army, to which he had held "ever since the battle of the frontiers," von Kluck then directed that by the next evening (5 September) three of his corps (IV, III, and IX, from west to east) should reach the Grand Morin, facing south, and constituting, with the II Cavalry Corps, a "strong wing marching in a southeasterly direction"; the IV Reserve Corps and the II Corps, supported by the IV Cavalry Division, were to protect the right flank; the IV Reserve Corps north of the Marne, and the II Corps south of that river. There follows a discussion, based upon the sources mentioned heretofore, of the circumstances that caused von Kluck to issue his "famous" order of 11:00 PM, 5 September, directing dispositions for the protection of his right flank and rear, which by that time were gravely menaced by the advance of the Sixth French Army. At 7:15 AM, 5 September, von Kluck had received from General Headquarters the general directive of 7:00 PM, 4 September, which ordered that his First Army remain between the Oise and the Marne, facing the "east front of Paris" and covering the crossings of the Marne to the west of Chateau Thierry. Late in the after-

noon, or early in the evening of 5 September (the author does not know the exact hour), Lieutenant Colonel von Hentsch had arrived at the headquarters of the First Army. He had come from General Headquarters, and he brought confirmation of the new general directive, together with detailed information of the general situation, which indicated that large enemy forces were being assembled in the vicinity of Paris. This confirmed the information of important railroad movements from Romilly towards the west, which von Kluck had received from the Second Army at 5:20 PM. However, it was not until after the receipt of direct information (which, the author believes, reached the headquarters of the First Army some time after the arrival of von Hentsch) that "his flank guard on the Ourcq (IV Reserve Corps and IV Cavalry Division) was engaged with important enemy forces", that von Kluck decided to issue his order of 11:00 PM, 5 September. Even then, von Kluck adopted but "a half measure which, while permitting him to await a clearing of the situation, would also enable him to engage his right (II and IV Corps) in the Battle of the Ourcq, in case of need, or to engage his left (III and IX Corps) in the Battle of the Seine." The discussion of General Mallerterre's first point is extended to include 7 September, and sets forth the steps taken by von Kluck to extricate his army from the dangerous situation, which had arisen largely because of his failure to execute at once the instructions of General Headquarters.

With regard to the second point (relating to the strength of the German forces that would have confronted the Sixth French Army had its attack been withheld until 7 September), the author presents definite conclusions. Assuming that the Sixth French Army had not "molested von Gronau (IV Reserve Corps) and von Kluck's communications," the First German Army, by the evening of 6 September, would have been disposed as follows: Instead of facing the east front of Paris, between the Oise and the Marne, it would have had its left east of Provins and facing south, its center facing to the southeast towards Provins, and its right, "in flank guard in two echelons," one (IV Reserve Corps and IV Cavalry Division) north of the Marne, or astride that river, facing west, and the other (II Corps) south of the Marne, facing southwest.

On the other hand, the Second Army (von Bülow), in the endeavor to accomplish the plan of the German High Command (the general directive of 7:00 PM, 4 September), would have remained "facing the east front of Paris between the Marne and the Seine, as von Bülow's account clearly shows." Thus, the evening of 6 September would have found the First and Second German Armies in a state of "extreme confusion."

The author holds that the situation did not require the French High Command to begin its general offensive on 6 September. He quotes Gallieni as having had the opinion that a continuance of the retreat of the Allied left to the south of the Seine, was inadvisable and unnecessary; while, at the same time, the latter believed it necessary, in order that von Kluck's enveloping movement might be averted and the Allied left wing disengaged, that the bulk of Manoury's Sixth Army attack, without delay, towards the east, against the German right flank. But, in the opinion of the author, a disengagement of the Allied left wing was the least result that should have been expected from an envelopment of the German right flank. For if Manoury's attack had been withheld until 7 or 8 September, by which time von Kluck would have been still further south of the Marne, and in the midst of his own enveloping maneuver, the First German Army might well have been destroyed. After quoting General Malletierre as admitting that "if the intervention of Manoury's army had been delayed until 7 or 8 September, it would have been strengthened by from two to three divisions," it is stated as a fact that by the evening of 7 September the Sixth French Army had been reinforced by two infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions. The argument is that Gallieni was somewhat precipitate, and that he went beyond his proper province, in ordering Manoury to advance on 5 September. This movement resulted in the discovery by von Kluck of the dangerous situation on his right flank. If Gallieni had waited twenty-four hours (until 6 September), von Kluck would have been more thoroughly committed to his movement south of the Marne, and Manoury would have been reinforced by one infantry division and one cavalry division. (A similar reinforcement was received on 7 September.) (The author seems to have the impression that Gallieni's action, and his telephonic report of his plan, had

much influence with Joffre in the latter's selection of 6 September for the launching of the Allied general offensive.) Further, after the receipt of Joffre's directive of 4 September (for the general offensive), Gallieni should have withheld his attack of 6 September (and the British should have done likewise), until the "front of the hostile army" had been contained by the offensive of the French armies further to the east.

The author draws the following conclusions:

1. That the retreat of von Kluck's First Army, which began the night of 5-6 September, was the direct consequence of the advance of the Sixth French Army against his flank guard which protected his communications, and was not caused by the orders of the German General Headquarters, "repeated by von Hentsch."

2. That if the Sixth French Army had attacked on 6 September instead of 5 September, it would have had less difficulty in enveloping von Kluck's right; for his II and IV Corps, more fully committed south of the Marne, and, simultaneously with Manoury's attack, held in front by the general offensive which began on 6 September, could have come less rapidly to the assistance of the IV Reserve Corps.

3. That the situation did not at all require the French High Command to begin its general offensive on 6 September. On the contrary, the passage of each day would have seen the Allied left reinforced by elements coming from the east, and the German right more completely and more dangerously exposed south of the Marne, its communications more vulnerable and more open to seizure by an enveloping attack by the Allied left.

Finally, the author submits that the selection of the most favorable "moment" for the launching of the Allied general offensive was a question of hours rather than of days, as is shown by the title of his study; which differs from that of General Malleterre's article only in the substitution of "twenty-four hours" for "a day."

It is obvious that the conclusions of the author fall within the category of things that might have been, those after-the-event arguments the accuracy of which can never be proven. But the article is interesting and instructive, it is of general value to all military students, and of special value to any officer engaged in a study of the First Battle of the Marne.

P. H. B.

L'OFFENSIVE DE 1917 ET LE COMMANDEMENT DU GÉNÉRAL
NIVELLE—(THE OFFENSIVE OF 1917 AND THE COMMAND
OF GENERAL NIVELLE)

By Major de Civrieux. French text, 267 pages. (1919.) Library No. 940.411.

In this most interesting book, the author makes a critical analysis of the plans for the great Franco-British Offensive of April and May, 1917, and of the circumstances under which that offensive was discontinued. The book should be of absorbing interest to any student of military history. It goes deeply and unhesitatingly into the causes of the premature suspension of one of the greatest offensives ever launched.

Though the book presents an interesting study from the viewpoint of the commander of a great theater of operations, its chief interest lies in the astounding civil intrigue which it unfolds before its readers—an intrigue which in the dark year 1917, all but destroyed all chances of victory for France and her Allies.

In November following the Somme and Verdun battles (1916), there was held at Chantilly a military conference at which were Generals Joffre, Marshal Haig, and the chiefs of staff, or chiefs of mission, of Russia, Italy, Belgium, Roumania, and Servia. These officials, representing their respective countries, drew up and signed a written agreement that the first fortnight in February, 1917, each Allied country, using all available means, would participate in a combined general offensive. The object of the offensive was "To give to the campaigns of 1917 a decisive character."

Immediately following the conference, General Joffre drew up a general plan for the combined offensive of the French and British armies. He also drew up instructions covering the principles and methods to be employed. These included: wide front of attack, artillery fire in depth, greatest effort where progress is least difficult, envelopment and out-flanking of strong points, speed, rupture of hostile position, and rapid and energetic exploitation in depth—principles and methods that are sound today.

The author briefly criticises the relief of General Joffre from command of the French Armies on December 12, 1916.

Of those considered for appointment to succeed Joffre, the author discusses fully Generals Nivelle and Pétain, and briefly Generals Foch and Castelnau. General Joffre favored Nivelle and this appears to have been the deciding influence in favor of Nivelle.

General Nivelle adapted a plan of operations which did not differ greatly from that of Joffre. The principles and methods which he prescribed were also similar to those enunciated by Joffre. The author gives the text of the more important directives issued by Nivelle before and during the offensive. As a preliminary to the offensive, it was necessary to have the British relieve the French in the sector between the Somme and Oise. The time required to carry this out, and other causes, necessitated a postponement of the time set for the launching of offensive to the middle of March.

On March 1, the German withdrawal on the Somme commenced. Marshal Haig believed that this withdrawal presaged a general attack by Hindenburg, and favored delaying, or possibly abandoning, the projected offensive. Another conference followed, and it was agreed that, for the purposes of the projected offensive, the British would strategically be subordinated to the French Commander-in-Chief. The author claims that Marshal Haig was very reluctant to accept this subordination, and produces correspondence in support of his claim. Another conference followed, in London, and the agreement as to strategic subordination of the British Army to the French Commander-in-Chief was confirmed. Marshal Haig accepted the results with reservations. The author says: "To remove the hostility of the great British Chiefs to a strategic subordination, the disaster of March 21 (1918), the destruction of the Fifth British Army, and the imminent danger of the whole British force being driven into the sea, were necessary."

Due apparently to the German withdrawal and the difficulties of securing British acquiescence to General Nivelle's plans, and possibly to other causes, the offensive was now postponed until April.

On March 21, M. Briand, "broken by lobbying agitators, gave up his place in the Ribot cabinet to M. Painlevé," whom the author describes as an incompetent theorist.

The author states that M. Painlevé, immediately starting a campaign against the spring offensive, poisoned the minds of General Nivelle's subordinates and destroyed their confidence in him. M. Painlevé appears, beyond doubt, to have been bitterly opposed to the offensive which had been formally agreed upon. M. Painlevé's opposition to General Nivelle and the plan to initiate offensive operations was so bitter that General Nivelle, explaining that "under the conditions existing, the exercise of command is rendered impossible," tendered his resignation as commander-in-chief. General Nivelle was, however, prevailed upon to retain command.

The British attack was launched on April 9 and the main French attack on April 16.

The author claims that as soon as the French attack started, secret steps were taken in Paris to paralyze and then stop the offensive. By April 18 the British Government having received information to the effect that the French Government might discontinue the offensive at an early date, requested the views of Marshal Haig. In his reply Haig urged in the strongest terms the continuation of the offensive. He stated that the battle was progressing satisfactorily, that the power of resistance of the Germans had been lowered, that the "*chances of success this year are remarkably good if we do not relax our efforts.*" In closing his statement he urged that the offensive be waged in accordance with the agreement entered into at Chantilly.

Though the weather was very bad the French attack made some progress. General Nivelle appears to have been confident of victory and the troops enthusiastic, but the great offensive, nevertheless, was destined to an unhappy termination. The losses being sustained appear to have been grossly exaggerated in Paris, and M. Painlevé appears to have been completely obsessed with the question of losses. He claimed that he had learned from a dependable source *which he could not divulge* that the planned attack on Brimont would entail 60,000 casualties. The absurdity of this estimate is well demonstrated by the author.

On April 26 Marshal Haig visited Paris and urged the French Government to continue the battle. But his efforts were of no avail, for, on April 29, M. Painlevé called General

Nivelle on the telephone and announced "The council of ministers has decided to suspend the attack on Brimont."

The British were thoroughly alarmed at the attitude of the French government, and Premier Lloyd George, Marshal Haig, and Admiral Jellicoe hastened to Paris where they arrived May 4. Lloyd George stated that during the offensive then in progress the British had captured 45,000 prisoners, more than 450 cannon, and more than 800 machine guns, and had reconquered an area of 200 square kilometers. He made an impassioned appeal to the French government to continue the offensive. The French government's immediate answer was a promise to continue the offensive but voiced its anxiety for conserving men and avoiding losses. However, the real answer came a few days later (May 10) when General Nivelle was informed that he would be relieved of command of the French armies. He was told that "The Pétain method had been judged preferable to the Nivelle-Mangin method."

General Pétain who relieved General Nivelle was "impressed by trench warfare and awed by the power of the Germans. He placed his hope in an indefinite resistance and in a fatalistic wait." He was "notoriously hostile to the strategic offensive." With his appointment to supreme command the great offensive was, to all intents and purposes, at an end.

It is worthy of note that between the beginning of the offensive and the time when the offensive virtually ceased through the appointment of Pétain, all of the German divisions on the Western Front had been engaged, some of them twice. The French had captured the Chemin Des Dames and the British were progressing satisfactorily, as noted above. The depression in Germany became great during the offensive and morale reached a low ebb. A great sigh of relief went up in Germany when the French stopped their offensive. As the author points out, there is every reason to believe that an offensive vigorously pushed and exploited would have ended the war in 1917. This appears to be in accordance with the views held by both Nivelle and Haig. On April 1, 1917, the forces available to the opposing sides on the Western front were:

French.....	2,600,000
British.....	1,800,000
Belgians.....	100,000
Total Allies.....	4,500,000
Germans.....	2,700,000
Allied preponderance.....	1,800,000

The Russian Army was still in existence, and 90 German divisions were between the Baltic and Black Seas. There was every ground to fear the early elimination of Russia, and no American contingent of importance could be expected in line for at least another year. It was the hour of opportunity for the Allies; but the Painlevé-Pétain combination threw away the opportunity. A year later it was wholly different. Russia and Roumania had been eliminated and the humiliating treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest had been signed. Italy had been crushed and America was not yet in a position to make her strength felt. From March to July, 1918, Germany had a superiority of numbers on the Western Front. How narrowly Germany missed gaining a decision during these months is well known. Painlevé's action in stopping the offensive of 1917 to *save lives*, cost in the end hundreds of thousands of lives and entailed expense almost beyond measure.

The excuse for the suspension of the French offensive appears to have been that the losses being incurred were too great. In this connection the following figures are interesting.

Total French Force on Western Front.....	2,600,000
Combined losses, French IV, V, VI, and X Armies, 16-25 April, 1917,	
Killed.....	15,589
Wounded.....	60,036
Missing.....	20,500
Average loss per division.....	2,380

On the Somme, 1-15 September, 1916, the loss was 2,350 per division.

It is worthy of note that though Nivelle made strenuous efforts to induce Russia and Italy to keep their agreements to attack in conjunction with the other Allies both countries utterly failed to keep their promises.

Soon after the offensive was discontinued, serious mutinies broke out in the French Army. It was claimed by the Painlevé adherents that these mutinies were the outcome of the losses incurred under Nivelle's attacks, but such claims appear to be

wholly groundless. The author attributes the mutinies to the propaganda of defeatists, anarchists, and radicals (which propaganda General Nivelle had appealed in vain to the government to suppress), and to the discouragement and discontent which resulted from the giving up of the offensive (heralded as a defeat) and returning to trench warfare.

Upon relief from command General Nivelle received most humiliating treatment. He remained for a time assigned to a group of armies which existed only in name. This assignment finally was revoked and he was informed that he had been given a rest leave. He remained "shelved" during the remainder of the war. "Such was the treatment accorded to the true savior of Verdun and the liberator of Douaumont and Vaux."

The author points out that the pernicious activities of Painlevé did not end with the devitalization of the offensive. On July 7, 1917, he declared in the Chamber of Deputies that the Government was against attacks in depth, and was committed to the defensive with occasional limited objective attacks. Having been furnished this valuable information by the French Minister of War, the Germans were able to take divisions from the French front to meet the Russian offensive in Galicia, and make possible the Russian debacle. The same announced policy enabled the Central powers to crush Italy on the Piave in the autumn of 1917.

The author shows great bitterness, and many of his statements are most astounding, but it must be admitted that he presents much convincing proof (copies of letters, messages, etc.) in support of his statements, and the reader is apt to reach the conclusion that the great offensive was not stopped by German resistance alone, but even in a greater measure by the machinations and intrigue of timid and incompetent politicians safe from the perils of battle.

The book is considered of general value.

X.

41ST R. F. A., WEDNESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER, 1914.

By Major A. F. Becke (late R.F.A.). (Based on War Diaries.)—*Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July, 1925. 33 pages, 2 maps.

This article is a description of the action of November 11, 1914, on the front of the British 1st (Guards) Brigade (1st

Division). On this day a German corps attacked, at 9:00 AM, astride the Menin Road, after a very heavy artillery preparation.

The article describes how the 41st Brigade R. F. A., after its telephone lines were shot out, held its positions for the entire day. For a very large part of the day the batteries were the front line and, by their fire, really held the German attack after the defensive position had been penetrated for some distance. Battery commanders improvised a close defense of the guns with such men as could be assembled. A counterattack relieved the situation in the afternoon.

The article is of general interest to all officers and of special value to artillery officers as an example of close defense of guns and as showing the effectiveness of artillery fire at close range.

J. P. M.

TANNENBERG

By General Hermann von Giehrl, German Army. German text, 95 pages, 7 maps. (Berlin: Mittler & Sons, 1923.) Library No. 940.41211.

General von Giehrl, who was an eye witness of the Battle of Tannenberg, holding successively three different general staff positions at the Headquarters of the German Eighth Army during the rapidly changing course of the battle, served after the war as a member of the German Great General Staff until the final dissolution of the latter.

In the foreword, the author states that his account of the battle is based primarily on his own personal knowledge acquired during the operations, as the incumbent of general staff positions which enabled him to gain an insight into the general action. Other sources consulted are the official records of the war to which he had access while a member of the Great General Staff, and the existing meager German military literature concerning this battle, special mention being made of the following:

My Memoirs of the War, by Ludendorff;
The Battle of the Marne and Tannenberg, by von François;
The Heroic Battles of My Troops, by von Morgen;
The Great War, 1914-1918, by Schwarte. (The Battle of Tannenberg, prepared by Colonel Frantz, based on official records.)

Concerning Russian sources, the author states that to his knowledge, outside of a few short essays which offer nothing special, no comprehensive account of the battle has made its appearance, and that the only publication of any importance representing the Russian side is the highly interesting work "*With the Russian Army*" by the British General Knox, military attaché in Russia from 1914 to 1917, which gives a valuable insight into the Russian command conditions at that time.

According to the author, Tannenberg is the first battle since Cannes in which a numerically inferior force has succeeded in destroying the superior opposing force in the sense of Clausewitzian requirements. It is therefore all the more remarkable that the true course of this important battle has so far remained unknown. In the meantime, a number of legends have sprung up and have been generally accepted even by serious minded persons, thus rendering difficult, if not impossible, the complete effacement of the prevailing misconceptions.

One legend relates how General von Hindenburg, while serving as a general staff officer at Königsberg before the war, carefully prepared the plan for the future Battle of Tannenberg, and how he surveyed the Masurian Lakes into which he later drove the Russians. Another favorite legend has it that innumerable Russians were drowned in the East-Prussian Lakes during the battle, and that the cries of the drowning Russians, rising above the noise of battle, created a positively sinister impression.

Popular opinion thus ascribes the greatness of the battle to its systematic organization which it believes to have been the result of a premeditated program prepared a long time in advance, and sees its culminating point in the crowding of the Russians toward the East-Prussian Lakes.

The answer to this deeply rooted popular conception is as follows:

It is of course a fable that General von Hindenburg prepared the plan of the battle while serving as a general staff officer in Königsberg in 1881; for the professional soldier no proof is needed; for him the improvised battle which Tannenberg was in reality is of much greater significance because it

made far greater demands on the will power and resolution of the commander.

The truth at the bottom of the popular version—and there is generally a grain of truth in all legends—is that the Prussian Great General Staff had occupied itself very thoroughly with the strategical problems of the east, and that it had devoted much careful work to the problems which might possibly require solution in the event of a major war in East-Prussia. The peculiar shape of East-Prussia and the location of the great Masurian Lakes formed the military-geographical basis on which a small German army could and must operate effectively if it would do justice to its difficult mission. General Count von Schlieffen then set for himself the special task of making the actual strategical problems the subject of war games and general staff problems, thereby producing a general staff work looking far into the future which deserves the highest recognition, but which does not detract in the slightest degree from the merit of the men who finally had to solve the actual problem of the year 1914.

Concerning the other popular belief, the masses of drowned Russians is in fact pure fiction, since the battle took place outside the lake region proper; only the lakes east of Hohenstein which are insignificant in comparison to the Masurian Lakes witnessed any fighting. It is possible that a few hundred Russians were here crowded into the water and drowned.

Thus, the plan of the battle did by no means seek or obtain culmination in the crowding of the Russians into the—here nonexistent—lakes; nevertheless the legend of masses of drowned Russians has found credence and has become deeply rooted even in the ranks of the German Eighth Army, as disclosed by conversations held by the author with other officers of that army.

These preliminary explanations are followed by the events leading up to and during the battle, arranged under the following headings:

- The Strategical Situation and the Measures taken by the Commander of the German Eighth Army up to 20 August, 1914.
- The Change of Commanders of the Eighth Army.
- The Plan of Battle of the New Commander.
- The Situation on the Russian Side.
- The German Conception of the Situation on 24 August.
- The Engagements on 26 August.

July-September, 1925

The First Attack of the I Army Corps at Usdan on 26 August.
The Engagement at Bössau on 26 August.
Continuation of the Engagement on 27 August on the Right Wing
of the Battle.
The Battle of Hohenstein on 29 August.
The 30 August.
The End of the Battle, 31 August.

In his conclusion, the author presents a brief summing up of the salient facts. The German Eighth Army lost a battle on 20 August from which several of its units, as for example the XVII Army Corps, emerged in a severely shaken condition. General von Prittwitz, the commander of the German Eighth Army decided to retire behind the Vistula, but during the course of this retirement, allowed himself to be induced by his military advisers to change his decision. Thus, the Battle of Tannenberg was initiated under the most difficult strategical conditions imaginable. The new army commander found himself opposed by two hostile armies one of which he attacked, while constantly being threatened by the possibility of interference by the other. The numerical inferiority resulting therefrom was tremendous, aside of the fact that the German forces contained numerous units of the second line. The advantages on the German side consisted in superior heavy artillery in quantity as well as quality, and in the fact that the operations took place in German territory which greatly facilitated the service of information.

The long duration of the battle was unusual. In the wars of Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and in 1870-71, a few battles lasted up to three days, and in the Russo-Japanese War there were also a few battles of several days; but, a meeting engagement, such as the Battle of Tannenberg, lasting six days (26-31 August), or even nine days if counted from 23 August, as is done in Russia, is a new experience in the history of war.

If the German Commander had known on 23 August that the battle sought by him would continue for six days, it is doubtful whether he would have taken it upon himself to operate practically without consideration of Rennenkampf's army, as he did.

The course of the battle has shown that, notwithstanding the generally very good information of the enemy, there were grave crises and critical moments every day, of such a nature

as to place in question the prospects of victory. Such critical tensions are not extraordinary; they can likewise be observed in the majority of battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. They are an extraordinary tax on the nerves of the responsible commander, and the test grows all the more severe the longer the wait for the decision.

Comparing the numbers on both sides, it is found that the much inferior side succeeded in victory. In this respect Tannenberg supersedes Sedan, where von Moltke had concentrated a powerful superiority against Mac Mahon. While Mac Mahon was already a heavily defeated general the bulk of whose troops had come directly from severe reverses, the Russians possessed a victorious army (Rennenkampf) in East-Prussia; the other Russian army (Samsonof) was unimpaired and fully capable of combat.

The conclusion is followed by an annex showing the organization of the German Eighth Army in East-Prussia on the first day of the battle (26 August, 1914).

This book is considered of general value to all officers and particularly to the G-2 Section, containing as it does the most complete military-historical account of the Battle of Tannenberg made available up to this time.

A. B.

THE DEFENSE OF IVANGOROD IN 1914-1915

Extracts from the Memoirs of Lieutenant General de Schwarz, formerly Russian Army and Governor of the Fortress. Translated from the Russian into French by Th. Goutchoff and into English by W. M. Black, Major General, U.S.A., Ret. 154 pages (typed), 2 maps. Library No. 623.1.

Lieutenant General C. de Grand Prey, French Army, states in his preface to this volume that the author, Lieutenant General de Schwarz, was born in 1874, of a Silesian family, one of whose branches moved into Russia in the 17th Century, and that several of his forbears were generals. General de Schwarz graduated from the Engineer School in 1895 and from the Superior Engineer School in 1902 with all obtainable honors. As a lieutenant he served on the Trans-Siberian Railway, in China and on the borders of Oussouri, passing through all the technical grades including chief of division. He participated in the Russo-Japanese War as chief of engineers of the sector east of Port Arthur. From 1905 to 1914, he served as professor,

Superior Engineer School, at the same time being a member of a commission charged with the writing of the History of the Russo-Japanese War, and also editor-in-chief of the Russian Military Encyclopaedia.

During the World War, General de Schwarz was governor of the Russian Fortress of Ivangorod and director of engineering on the Russian front in Poland. Later he accompanied the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Caucasus where he held high commands at Kars, Erzerum, and Trebizond (1915-1917). He then was appointed director of engineering at the Russian War Department. When the Germans were threatening Petrograd, he was placed in command of the Russian troops defending that city. In June, 1918, he escaped from the Bolsheviks to the south of Russia. In March, 1919, he was Governor of Odessa, commanding the Russian troops in the zone occupied by the Allies; when the latter left Russia he followed to France, establishing his residence in Paris.

General de Schwarz is a noted military writer, having produced numerous technical and historical works all of which are valuable. Several of his works were awarded gold medals and grand prizes in Russia. His principal work "*On the Influence of the Battles at Port Arthur on the Construction of Fortifications*" was translated into French, Italian, German, Swedish, Bulgarian, and English, and is considered as a military classic in the United States.

He revised the projects for the fortifications at Port Arthur, Novo-Georgiewsk, Warsaw, Ivangorod, Kars, Erzerum, and Petrograd and was actively engaged in carrying out the construction of several of these great fortresses. He also has made plans for the defense of positions of more than 2000 kilometers (1243 miles) in extent, notably along the Dniéper, the Bereznin, and the Pruth, besides constructing railways and military roads at Ivangorod, Trebizond, etc.

At this time he is the best known military engineer of Russia, and honors and rank have been showered upon him. He was appointed a Lieutenant General at the age of forty-three.

In his introduction to the translation of this volume, Major General J. L. Hines, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, states:

"A careful reading of these 'Extracts from the Memoirs of Lieutenant General de Schwarz' will disclose the fact that, notwithstanding the many lessons to be learned from the World War and the many inventions and improvements in means of destruction and their influence on tactics, yet insofar as the defense of fortified places is concerned, there is actually little new.

"To those of us who have stood on the crest of Fort Douaumont and viewed the devastation and destruction that accompanies stubborn defense by a field army, it is apparent wherein lay the strength of the defense of Verdun. And the words of General de Schwarz show that he appreciated from the outset the real strength of fortified localities, even before those who were responsible for the preparation of Verdun for defense. From the outset, he refused to lean too heavily upon the mere fortress garrison and bent every effort to obtain an adequate field force, at the same time strengthening the defenses and constructing such works as would afford this field army adequate cover and protection. In fact he converted his position into a real entrenched camp in the modern conception of that term.

"The Russian chiefs, with little regard for the preservation of man-power, gave little or no attention to fortifications as a means of conserving and augmenting human strength. General de Schwarz was conspicuous among the few who felt the truth of the celebrated saying of Vauban: 'The more earth, the less blood.' So we read in his book of advance positions, deep entrenchments, bomb proofs, deep dugouts, wire entanglements, narrow-gauge railroads, inundations, concealments of various kinds, extensive use of machine and light guns, and the holding of the principal lines of defense with small forces while strong reserves remain in concealment in rear, ready for counterattacks and sorties. In fact, he seems to have been a pioneer in the idea of distribution in depth in the defensive. And it is notable that, particularly in the earlier fighting maneuvers about Ivangorod as a pivot, the field army under his command never succumbed to the pernicious attraction of the fortress but, falling back on it, formed the tactical flank position mentioned by von der Goltz.

"General de Schwarz also appreciated the great increase in effectiveness and the great element of safety secured by having the heavy field artillery mobile, thus adding to security as well as efficiency. The following from his description of the 1914 defense is worth noting: 'The artillery of the fortress lost neither a man nor a gun. That is explained by the fact that the enemy did not succeed in discovering the emplacements of a single one of our batteries.'

"To those of us who in the future would prepare ourselves for conducting the defense of localities and organizing all the work to be done, it would be well to read carefully the opening chapters of this book.

"Taking it all in all, the book is well worth reading and is replete with beneficial lessons."

The book is considered of general value to all officers.

A. B.

NOTES ON THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

By Major Sherman Miles, G.S.—*Coast Artillery Journal*, Dec., 1924, p. 506; Jan., 1925, p. 23; Feb., 1925, p. 119; March, 1925, p. 207 (conclusion). 84 pages, 10 maps.

These very interesting notes were prepared after what was evidently a thorough study of the subject, which included not only a study of the standard books on the campaign, and published and unpublished information furnished by the British General Staff and the Turkish General Staff, but also a careful study of the terrain passed over during four trips to the Gallipoli battlefields, twice under British and twice under Turkish guidance.

The author discusses what appears to him to be the salient points of the campaign, such as, its genesis, the period before the landing, the landing plans, the naval support of the landing, the Turkish defense, and the August attack. He makes no attempt to present a connected story, and on this account, in order to appreciate the notes fully, the reader should be more or less familiar with the conduct of the campaign as a whole. The presentation in the same text of both the Allied and the Turkish sides of the points discussed, adds materially to the interest. Furthermore, the article is enlivened throughout by numerous pertinent notes and comments by General

Ian Hamilton, such as, for example, when during the author's able discussion of a possible violation of the principle of dispersion in the August attack, the reader is brought to earth by the General's remarks on the necessity for some dispersion on account of the scarcity of drinking water.

Of the several discussions, that of the conduct of the Turkish defense is by no means the least interesting, on account of its similarity to the problem of defending our own coast line. The locations of the Turkish troops at various times are shown by sketch maps, and the prompt and timely use of well placed reserves is clearly described.

The notes are of general interest to instructors at the General Service Schools.

W. B.

THE TRIUMPH OF UNARMED FORCES, 1914-1918

By Rear Admiral M. W. W. P. Consett, C.M.G. 344 pages. (Williams and Norgate, London, 1923.) Library No. 940.34.

This book was written by Admiral Consett to show why the World War was prolonged far beyond the limits of necessity. It demonstrates the far reaching and evil effects of trade on the conduct of a war by showing how the failure to employ the full resources of the British empire led to the protraction of the war.

The author who served for six years as Naval Attaché in Scandinavia, including the four years of the war, is especially well qualified to write on the subjects covered in this book. Most of the facts and data presented are based on his personal observation. The book has created a great deal of comment in England as it is the first attempt at disclosure of the serious conditions of affairs that were permitted to exist during the war.

In August, 1914, Germany was prepared and equipped for only a short campaign. It is beyond all reasonable doubt that her chief and immediate object was the subjugation of France. England's entry and the battle of the Marne finally destroyed Germany's hopes of an early victory, and made victory itself uncertain and possible only after a long and tedious struggle.

Germany saw that her existence depended upon her ability to import supplies from overseas, The war thus resolved

itself into a struggle for the mastery of these supplies, whose war status was governed by conditions, some of which were not in dispute, while others formed the subject of diplomatic controversy with America. Germany had free access to Scandinavian and Dutch produce; but Scandinavia herself was dependent upon overseas supplies for her industrial and economic existence. These supplies came from the neutral world and from Great Britain and her allies. Over the latter Great Britain had absolute control, but only partial and challenged control over neutral commerce. British and British-controlled supplies, it must be noted, were of great, and in some cases, of vital importance to Scandinavia.

What happened during the war was that Great Britain sent her own goods to Scandinavia, who passed them on directly to Germany, or used them either to release her native produce or to work her industries in the interests of Germany. British trade with Scandinavia continued for two and a half years, until, in 1917, Germany committed the blunder of declaring an unrestricted submarine warfare, thus virtually blockading herself by closing the North Sea to practically all traffic and bringing America into the war.

Part I of this volume deals with the rules of naval warfare and with the complications that arose with America before she joined the Allies. The author brings up one interesting point which occurred during the discussion with America. The question of British trade was raised by America, who asked for the figures relating to the export of cocoa. These figures showed that British exports had increased from about 300,000 pounds during the first four months of 1913 to about 3,000,000 pounds during the first quarter of 1914. This is a very serious increase; but it is only fair to say that the general dislocation of trade and its diversion from accustomed routes may possibly in part have accounted for it. Further reference is made to British trade, which was justified on the ground that it was on a scale less than that of America's export trade. Admiral Consett holds very strong views as to the effect of British trade on Anglo-American relations. But he brings very powerful reasoning to bear upon what he has to say on this subject, which is that British competitive trading lay at the root of the friction with America.

The subject matter of Part II deals with the transit of oversea supplies to Germany during their second stage. Many examples are given showing the great increase in export of essential war supplies from Scandinavian countries to Germany.

At the same time, both from British and neutral sources, the materials for the manufacture or produce of these war supplies were allowed to enter the Scandinavian countries in an uninterrupted stream.

Prodigious quantities of oil-seeds were sent to Denmark from British colonies and from Manchuria. These seeds had great fodder—and oil—that is to say, great explosive-value. The import of soya beans and copra into Denmark increased from a pre-war average of 68,000 tons to an average of 150,000 tons in 1915 and 1916. The export of cattle that were fattened by these seeds and that went on the hoof to Germany increased from 150,000 in 1913 to 305,000 in 1916.

The enormous access of wealth and trade that the war had brought to Denmark had enabled her to expand her food industries and to open up new ones. During the first seven months of 1916 the meat alone that she was able to export to Germany was sufficient to furnish about 1,000,000 meat rations per day throughout the seven months, on the scale of the current German army ration. So flourishing was Denmark during the war that special accommodation had to be provided for the grain that poured into the country.

The irony of this extraordinary situation lay in this, that the Danes, who at times could obtain neither fish nor meat in their own shops, which had to close down because the goods went to the lucrative markets of Germany, attributed the shortage to the harsh British blockade.

Similarly, in Sweden, the Swedish spindles were idle when the wharves and quays of Swedish ports were choked with cotton for Germany; and coffee, the favorite beverage of the Swede, was unobtainable in Swedish restaurants at a time when Sweden was exporting quantities to Germany.

The whole of the Sandinavian fishing industries depended mainly upon British or British-controlled supplies. The greater part of the immense products of these industries, from which fish-guano, fish-meal, and fish-oil were obtained, went to Germany, where, during the first two years of the war, fish

was the principal article of diet in trains and restaurants. From Denmark and Sweden alone during 1915, 1916, and 1917, Great Britain received 7,000 tons to Germany's 324,000 tons.

Coal is almost an essential to modern industries, yet Admiral Consett shows that England permitted enormous exportations of her own coal to Scandinavian states where it was largely used to operate the industries that were supplying Germany. The author believes that through the control of the exportation of coal alone England would have been able to have compelled the Scandinavian states to reduce their exportation of war supplies to Germany. English coal was almost an absolute essential for the industries of these states as Silesian and Belgian coal, which was provided to some extent by Germany, proved to be almost useless unless mixed with English coal. American coal was out of the question on account of long distance and lack of shipping space.

The English policy of permitting unlimited trading with the Scandinavian states instead of forcing her wishes on these states by economic pressure, was justified on the grounds of regard for small neutral states, of the improvement of the exchange, and to prevent Sweden, Denmark, and Holland from joining forces with Germany or from invasion by Germany in case they failed to furnish war supplies. That either of these two latter contingencies was highly improbable are shown by Admiral Consett's arguments which have been described as conclusive and unanswerable. Denmark's army was small, and for defensive purposes only; Denmark was supplying Germany with 300,000 tons of food a year. Sweden was employing the whole of her man-power in turning out her priceless ore for Germany to the extent of between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 tons a year, and supplying her with munitions and military equipment. Denmark was Germany's larder, Sweden her workshop. The industries of these states were vitalized by British coal. With the extreme probability that Norway would join the Entente powers, with the Scandinavian ports closed to commerce by the British fleet, with the Swedish army withdrawn from the mines and workshops, and, moreover, having to defend the Norwegian frontier and the west coast, with our enemies the only available source of supplies, with, in short, everything to lose and nothing to gain; was it likely that

Holland, Denmark, and Sweden would abandon the unprecedented prosperity that they were enjoying and face almost certain and irreparable disaster?

Or was it likely that Germany, except on the supposition of a set of favorable circumstances, too fantastic to receive consideration, could view the prospect of the turmoil into which Scandinavia would be thrown, except with the worst forebodings, and as pregnant with the gravest possibilities?

The book is considered of general interest to all officers.

S. K.

ROBERT E. LEE, THE SOLDIER

By Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice, British Army. 290 pages. Library No. 923.

This book contains an excellent account of General Lee's strategy which it divides into three phases *viz*: First, the defensive during which he was seeking time to organize, train, and prepare his forces for the offensive. This phase extended from the early stages of the war to the Seven Days battles around Richmond in 1862. Second, the offensive in which he sought every opportunity to attack not only in Virginia but also in hostile territory. This period extended from the Seven Days battles around Richmond to Gettysburg in 1863. Third, this phase was again the defensive and includes the period from the failure at Gettysburg to the end of the war, during which time he endeavored to convince the North that the subjugation of the Confederacy was either impossible or not worth the cost in lives and treasure.

Lee's military defects are not glossed over but are frankly discussed, an important one being his unwillingness to control some of his subordinates, especially Longstreet. His relations with Jackson and his influence on Jackson's strategy are also brought out clearly. The author's discussion of Lee's strategy in general is enhanced by the fact that he was able to incorporate therein data obtained from "Lee's Confidential Despatches to Davis" published for the first time in 1915.

This book is of general value to the instructor personnel at these schools, and to all officers of field grade and above.

C. W. J.

(NOTE:—See also *Military Surgeon*, August, 1925, page 224; also, *Coast Artillery Journal*, September, 1925, page 301; for British review see *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, August, 1925, page 604.)

II. SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT ARTICLES THAT HAVE APPEARED IN MAGAZINES

United States

MILITARY MAGAZINES

Army and Navy Journal. June 27, 1925: New Army Air Policy Defined for Officers Not of the Air Service.

Army Ordnance. May-June, 1925: General Summerall Urges Industrial Preparedness Before New York Post, A.O.A.; Chemistry in War: An 18th Century Viewpoint; Italian Tanks.

July-Aug., 1925: Development of the Cross-Country Car; Ordnance Activities in Hawaii.

Cavalry Journal. July, 1925: Two Great Captains: Jenghiz Khan and Subutai.

Chemical Warfare. June 15, 1925: Chemical Warfare and its Relation to National Defense; Gas in Warfare.

July 15, 1925: The Dangers of a Russo-German Aero-Chemical Attack.

Aug. 15, and Sept. 15, 1925: League Totals Losses Caused by World War; Reds to Use Disease Germs to Subdue Future Enemies; Chemistry in War: An 18th Century Viewpoint.

Coast Artillery Journal. July, 1925: Review of "The Campaign in Mesopotamia"; Review of "The Constitution of the United States."

Aug., 1925: Combat Methods of the Japanese; Relations of Land and Sea Power; The Battles of Ludendorff on the Russian Front; Corps Antiaircraft on the Offensive.

Sept., 1925: The Battles of Ludendorff on the Russian Front (continued); Robert E. Lee, the Soldier (a review).

Field Artillery Journal. July-Aug., 1925: The Defense Policy of the United States; What the Germans Think of the French Artillery.

Sept.-Oct., 1925: Liaison with and Fire Support of the Front Line Infantry.

Infantry Journal. July, 1925: Mobilization for Two Wars; A Trained Regiment in Combat.

Aug., 1925: Spanish Campaigns in Morocco; Light Artillery in Support of Infantry; East Meets West.

Sept., 1925: Providing for the Common Defense; Religious Pacifism; American Infantry and Artillery; Leadership; The Battle of New Orleans; Military Notes on Foreign Armies: Japan—Reorganization of the Army; Italy—Reorganization of the Air Service; France—Tank Organization; India—Strength of Army.

Marine Corps Gazette. June, 1925: The Fall Exercises of 1924.

Military Engineer. July-Aug., 1925: The Military Intelligence Division; The Status of Military Mapping; Engineer Combat Troops as Infantry; Meteorology, an Aid in Warfare.

Sept.-Oct., 1925: Electric Power During the World War; Engineer Combat Troops as Infantry.

Military Surgeon. Sept., 1925: Historical Parallels at Coblenz.

Remount. July, 1925: The Cavalry School Endurance Ride; The U. S. Army Team in England; The Selection, Preparation and Care of Horses for Endurance Rides.

United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Aug., 1925: National Strategy; Submarine Capabilities and Limitations; The Dacia Dilemma; The Army Industrial College.

Sept., 1925: The Bridge Across the Atlantic.

NON-MILITARY MAGAZINES

Aero Digest. Aug., 1925: Daniel Guggenheim Says "We Must Not Let Air Supremacy Slip"; Will Airplanes End War?

Sept., 1925: Admiral Sims Says "Aircraft Dooms Battleships"; Aircraft's Important Rôle at Hawaii; Gibraltar Shorn of Strength.

American Journal of International Law. July, 1925: Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis: The Work of a Lawyer, Statesman and Theologian; The League of Nations and Unanimity; International Sanctions and American Law; Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law.

The Annals. July, 1925: American Policy and International Security.

Atlantic Monthly. Sept., 1925: After Cavalry—What?

Bulletin of the Pan American Union. Sept., 1925: Brief Summary of the History of Uruguay; International Treaties.

Current History. July, 1925: Secret Document Reveals Britain's Darkest Hours; The Moroccan War an International Peril; Rumania's Claim to Bessarabia; Armies and Navies of the World.

Aug., 1925: Commerce Seeking to Conquer the Air; What America Is Doing for Haiti; Teaching War Strategy to Our Future Generals; Czech and Slovak at Odds; Armies and Navies of the World.

Sept., 1925: The Chinese Crisis—A Conflict of Cultures; China's Battle Against Foreign Control; Esperanto—The New World Language; Armies and Navies of the World; Morocco and the Riff Question (from *Le Correspondant*, Paris, July 10, 1925).

Foreign Affairs. Oct., 1925: The Responsibility for the War; The Ruhr Occupation; Comparative Tables of Armaments.

Historical Review. July, 1925: The Study of British Foreign Policy (Nineteenth Century); Germany and the Spanish-American War.

Literary Digest. July 25, 1925: The Red Army in Russian Eyes.

Aug. 1, 1925: Mussolini Defines Fascism.

Aug. 8, 1925: Did the Ruhr Occupation Pay?

Aug. 15, 1925: The Polish Deportations; Germany's Idea of Security.

Living Age. July 11, 1925: The Struggle in Manchuria.

July 25, 1925: What the Chinese People Want; Awakening Afghanistan.

Aug. 1, 1925: Morocco Episodes.

Aug. 8, 1925: Peru and the Plebiscite; How the Shanghai Trouble Started.

Aug. 22, 1925: The Watch on the Dniester.

North American Review. Sept.-Oct.-Nov., 1925: The Trend to an American Democracy; The Economics of Diplomacy.

Outlook. July 15, 1925: The War in Morocco; An American Policy in the Far East; The New Russia and the Old Way.

Aug. 26, 1925: Better News from the Riff; The Nebulous Japanese Menace.

Sept. 2, 1925: Intricate Issues in Asia.

Sept. 16, 1925: Which is Lamb and Which Wolf in the Riff?

Review of Reviews. July, 1925: The Armies of Europe in 1925; Is Real Peace Emerging in Europe? Mexico in the News Once More.

Aug., 1925: Red Backgrounds in Morocco and China.

Sept., 1925: John Bull and His Troubles; The Danzig Corridor; China's National Ideals; Our Philippine Problem; Abd-el-Krim and the War in Africa; What is "Military Intelligence"?

World's Work. Aug., 1925: Lord Grey on Colonel House and Crises in Diplomacy.

Yale Review. Oct., 1925: The Future of American Imperialism.

England

MILITARY MAGAZINES

Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette. Aug. 22, 1925: Army Manoeuvres (September, 1925) (editorial).

Cavalry Journal. July, 1925: The Decisive Battles of Alexander the Great (continued); German Cavalry in the Opening Stages of the Great War (continued); Australian Cavalry Leaders; "Horsey Fallacies."

Journal of the Royal United Service Institute. Aug., 1925: The Crossing of Rivers in Warfare (Lecture); Communications, the Vital Thread of War; Some Aspects of Future War on Land; The Air Force in Iraq (Lecture); A "New Model" Army; Spanish Morocco—A Recent Impression; French Morocco—The Situation Before the Outbreak of the Present Hostilities; Developments of Artillery and Mechanical Traction in the French Army.

Royal Artillery Journal. July, 1925: 41st R. F. A. Wednesday, 11th November, 1914 (see digest); F. S. R. Vol. II, 1924, on the Employment of Artillery; The Problem of the Tank; The Rôle of Forward Troops in the Collection of Intelligence in the Field; Artillery Tactics; Tanks in Rear Guard Operations.

Royal Engineers Journal. June, 1925: The Position of Engineers in the Army Organization; The Principles of Defensive Warfare; The Training of the Regular Officer in Australia; The Experimental Ponton Equipment; The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919.

Sept., 1925: Notes by a Chief Engineer during the Great War of 1914-1918; The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919.

Royal Tank Corps Journal. July, 1925: Tanks in India.

France

MILITARY MAGAZINES

Revue de Cavalerie. May-June, 1925: The Maneuvers of the 4th Cavalry Division at Camp Wahn (to be continued).

July-Aug., 1925: The Maneuvers of the 4th Cavalry Division at Camp Wahn (conclusion).

Revue d'Infanterie. June 1, 1925: Three Crossings of the Rhine by the Armies of the French Republic.

July 1, 1925: What Every Officer Should Know of the Artillery (IV); Artillery Support of the Infantry. Immediate Accompaniment. Direct Support.

Aug. 1, 1925: What Every Officer Should Know of the Artillery (conclusion); A Solution of the Tactical Problem given in the Competitive Examination for Admission into the École Supérieure de Guerre in 1925.

Revue Militaire Française. June 1, 1925: French and German Fortifications (conclusion); A Meeting Engagement—Virton (conclusion); Was the Battle of the Marne Launched 24 Hours Too Soon? (continued).

July 1, 1925: Was the Battle of the Marne Launched 24 Hours Too Soon? (conclusion—see digest); Concerning German Opinion of French Military Conceptions; A Second Lesson of the War of Secession (I); The Wearing Down of the German Effectives in 1918.

August 1, 1925: German Command and Turkish Command During the World War; A Second Lesson of the War of Secession (II); Concerning a German Criticism of French Military Conceptions (conclusion); Concerning Methods of Employment of the Artillery; The Battle of Courcelles-Méry (I).

Sept. 1, 1925: The French Command in Eastern Thrace; The Transmission Service for Large Units in the Maneuvers of 1924; The Battle of Courcelles-Méry (continued); A Second Lesson of the War of Secession (conclusion).

Germany

MILITARY MAGAZINES

Heerestechnik. June, 1925: The Mechanization of Modern Armies.

Militär-Wochenblatt. June 11, 1925: The English Official History of the World War (a review).

July 11, 1925: Concerning the Schlieffen Plan and the Moltke Concentration in 1914; The English Army in the Battles of 1914; The German April, 1918, Offensive at Armentières; Review of General Bullard's Memoirs of the World War (editorial).

Aug. 25, 1925: The Conclusions reached by the Investigating Committee Concerning the Break-down of the 1918 Offensvie; The Battle of St. Quentin, 1914 (2d Part); The Battle of Shavli, July, 1915.

Wissen und Wehr. June, 1925: The Influence of Fortresses on Operations; Tanks and Antitank Defense.

Canada

MILITARY MAGAZINES

Military Gazette. July 28, 1925: Sir Andrew Macphail's Contribution to Canada's Official History of the War.

Italy

MILITARY MAGAZINES

La Cooperazione Delle Armi. June, 1925: The Divisional Infantry Commander.

July, 1925: The Division.

III. REVIEW OF BOOKS

MEMOIRS OF A NAPOLEONIC OFFICER

By Jean-Baptiste Barrès, Major of Infantry, French Army. 309 pages. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925.) Library No. 923.

The diary of an educated man who, enlisting in the Imperial Guard in 1804, served France for thirty-one years under five régimes and in grades from private to major.

The work gives in great detail the experiences of an infantryman of the Imperial Epoch. The writer's observations on marches, billets, clothing, equipment, and rations being as applicable today as they were one hundred years ago.

An interesting detail is the movement by cart of a part of the Guard during the concentration of the French Army preparatory to the Prussian campaign of 1806.

The book is of moderate general interest.

W. R. W.

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

By "Footslogger." 88 pages. (London: Forster Groom & Co., Ltd., 1925.) Library No. 952.

This is an abbreviated account of the Russo-Japanese War from its outbreak to include the battle of Liao-Yang. The book contains six very brief chapters. The treatment of the subject is very similar to that by Colonel Howland in his History of the World War, namely, an outline of the events in each engagement is presented after which consideration is given to how these events were influenced by the factors of: (1) time, (2) space, (3) relative strength and morale, (4) training, (5) ground, (6) weather, (7) armament, (8) communications, and (9) general resources, and then, at the end of each chapter, conclusions are given as to the extent to which the following principles were observed or neglected, both by the Russians and the Japanese; the principles of (1) maintenance of the objective, (2) offensive action, (3) surprise, (4) concentration, (5) economy of force, (6) security, (7) mobility, (8) cooperation, (9) reconnaissance, (10) fire and movement, and (11) exploitation of success.

The conclusions are well presented but in many cases few, if any, facts to sustain them have been given.

A useful book to read in connection with the one under review in order to obtain facts is "The Campaign of Liao-Yang" by Major H. Rowan-Robinson, R. A., reviewed on page twenty-five of R. C. M. W. No. 17, 1925.

The book is of some general value, chiefly as presenting a brief outline of the events of the Russo-Japanese War and suggesting for consideration the lessons to be learned therefrom. It is a good book to refresh the memory of one already familiar with the Russo-Japanese War, and can be read in one evening.

O. H. S.

LA GUERRE VUE D'EN BAS ET D'EN HAUT—(THE WAR AS SEEN FROM VARIOUS VIEWPOINTS)

By Abel Ferry, French Deputy and Officer of the French Army. French text, 324 pages. (Paris: Bernard Grasset, Éditeur, 1920.) Library No. 940.336.

This volume contains the views of the author as to the conduct of the war by the French Army and the French government. The author from his experiences as an officer engaged in actual hostilities and as a member of the Army Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies gives his impressions of how the war was conducted. The text consists of letters, memoirs, and speeches in the Chamber of Deputies between October, 1914 and September, 1918, contemporaneous with the matter discussed.

In general these documents and speeches criticize the conduct of operations both by the high command and by the French government. They point out the conflict of authority between the civil and military authorities, the shortage of artillery *matériel* and ammunition, the inexperience of staffs in so called "stabilized warfare," the lack of adequate reserves and the evils of constantly changing commanders of armies, corps, and divisions during active operations. The author argues that the French government failed to organize the French nation for war during the early years of the conflict, that neither the civil nor military authority grasped the magnitude of the conflict, and that as a result of this, tens of

thousands of men were needlessly lost and the war unduly prolonged.

The entire work is an excellent criticism of the failure of the French government and the high command to coordinate their respective activities so as to produce maximum effort on the field of battle. It points out the inherent weakness of a parliamentary régime in time of grave national danger.

The book has general value as a treatise on organization of a nation for war and the utilization of the entire national resources both material and human. The book is considered more suited for a General Staff study than for use at these schools.

E. S.

L'ORGANISATION ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES ETATS-MAJOR
EN CAMPAGNE—(THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING
OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN CAMPAIGN)

By French War Dept. French text, 69 pages. (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Co., 1925.) Library No. 355.4.

This work is the published report of a commission appointed by the French Minister of War to draw up instructions covering the duties of the General Staff in campaign.

The report recommends that the General Staff of all larger units starting with the Army and ending with the Infantry division be divided into four (4) *Bureaus* (corresponding to our four sections of the General Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4) and that each of these *bureaus* be in turn subdivided into certain designated *sections*, whose duties are prescribed in the report.

The report carefully differentiates between the rôle of commanders, which is to make decisions, and the rôle of their general staff officers, which is to assist the commander (1) by furnishing such data as the commander requires to make his decision and (2) by executing the decision, once it is made.

The book is considered of special value to the Command and G-4 sections.

H. S. G.

AUFMARSCH NACH ZWEI FRONTEN AUF GRUND DER OPERATIONSPLÄNE VON 1871-1914—(CONCENTRATION ON TWO FRONTS BASED ON THE PLANS OF OPERATIONS FROM 1871 TO 1914)

By H. von Staabs, General of Infantry, German Army, Ret. German text, 85 pages. (Berlin: Mittler & Son, 1925.) Library No. 940.4.

In his introduction, the author states that in 1870-71 the railways, for the first time in military history, proved themselves to be an important instrument of war which is indispensable to General Headquarters for the mobilization and concentration of the armies. Since that time, the realization has rapidly grown that on the complete and skilful exploitation of the railways depends the more or less favorable situation from which may be seized and mastered the preliminary conditions for successful initial operations that may prove decisive in the course of the war. As supply and evacuation lines, the railways are indispensable for the maintenance and continuation of war. Their strategical exploitation is capable of surprisingly great results which may lead to a decisive change in the situation.

Contents:

1. The German Concentration in 1870.
2. Readiness for War on Two Fronts, 1871-1914.
 - Germany's Political and Military Situation.
 - The German Plans of Operation.
 - The Development of the German Railways from the Military Viewpoint.
 - The Military Railway System and the Preparations for Concentration up to 1903.
 - The Completion of the Organization of the Military Railways and of the Preparations for Concentration up to 1914.
3. The Outbreak of the World War.
 - The German Concentration and the Beginning of Operations.
 - Would it have been possible to change the German Plan of Campaign at the Outbreak of the War?
 - Would a Transformation of the Concentration have been possible?
 - How could the Operations have been conducted?
 - Final Considerations.
4. Electrical Locomotion and National Defense.

The book is considered of some value to the G-2 and G-4 sections at these schools, but is best suited for study at the War College.

A. B.

MUNITIONSKOLONNEN UND TRAINS IM WELTKRIEGE—(AMMUNITION COLUMNS AND TRAINS IN THE WORLD WAR)

By Lieut. Gen. Foest, German Army, Ret. German text, 285 pages. (*Offene Worte*, Charlottenburg, 1923.) Library No. 357.83.

Contents: War and the Service of Supply.—Organization at the Outbreak of the War.—Mobilization.—Activities in the Concentration Area.—Employment during the different Combat Periods.—Supply of Horses for the Army.—Influence of the Peculiarities of the Various Theaters of Operations.—Changes in Organization and Equipment.—Replacement of Personnel.—Shelter for Supply Columns Operating with Combat Units.—Clothing, Equipment and Armament, Repairs and Replacement.—General Army Equipment.—Loading and Equipment of Vehicles.—Repairs and Replacement of Vehicles.—Demobilization.—Subject Index.

Considering the fact that so far very little has been written concerning the logistical aspect of the World War, this volume is considered of special value to the G-4 section, as well as to all other officers concerned with the organization and operation of the service of supply in time of War.

A. B.

THE LONG ROAD TO BAGHDAD (VOLS. I & II)

By Edmund Candler (late official "Eye-Witness" in Mesopotamia). Total 600 pages, 19 maps, 16 plates. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1919.) Library No. 940.434.

The principal events described are:

The operations of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force between Fao (mouth of the Euphrates) and Ctesiphon (south-east of Baghdad), concluding with the retreat of General Townshend's force from the latter place to Kut-el-Amara where it was invested by the Turks.

The movements of the relief expedition toward Kut; the battles at Shaiker Saad, the Wadi, Umm-el-Hannah, Dujaila Hedoubt, El Orah, Beit Aieesa, and Sannaiyat, (January-April, 1916).

The capture of Kut and of General Townshend's force by the Turks.

The operations of General Maude's command about Kut and the capture of that place by the British (December, 1916 to February, 1917).

The crossing by force of the Tigris River above Kut and the defeat of the Turks at Sannaiyat (below Kut).

The pursuit of the Turks toward Baghdad and the capture of Baghdad.

Later operations.

This book is an account from the viewpoint of a civilian war correspondent who is very familiar with army life; it is well written and highly interesting. The horrors of war, and the suffering of the troops due to climatic conditions and the lack of food and of proper medical facilities are vividly depicted. Numerous collective and individual acts of heroism are mentioned. The author describes what he actually saw and what was told him by eye witnesses. The book is of interest to the military student on account of the reality of the descriptions of war contained therein.

C. H. W.

THE WAR IN THE AIR (VOL. I)

By Walter Raleigh. 489 pages. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922.) Library No. 940.9.

The history, of which this is the first volume, forms a part of the History of the Great War based on Official Documents, prepared by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defense.

This volume (Vol. I) contains the history of the origin and development of the British air service up to the beginning of the World War. It is of value only to officers desiring to make a special study of the history of military aviation.

A. B.

AIRCRAFT OF THE WORLD

By Major F. A. de V. Robertson. 98 pages, 16 plates. (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press.) Library No. 358.0.

This book contains a very general description and excellent illustrations of all types of aircraft in general use. It also quotes a certain amount of statistics of physical dimensions and performance characteristics of aircraft, all of which however may be obtained from official publications. The subject matter of the book, other than the figures mentioned, is presented in a very elementary way and contains numerous

errors, particularly with respect to the limitations of certain air navigation instruments now in use.

On the whole, this book is considered of negative value to these schools.

W. C. S.

L'OEUVRE DU GÉNÉRAL DE MIRIBEL—(THE WORK OF GENERAL DE MIRIBEL)

By General Arthur Boucher, formerly Chief of the 3d Section of the French General Staff. French text, 44 pages. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924.) Library No. 356.4.

An appreciation of the work of General de Miribel, who was made Chief of the French General Staff in 1881 and again in 1889. His general staff organization and mobilization plans in the event of war with Germany are briefly outlined.

The book, being an eloquent eulogy rather than a military study, is considered of negative value to these schools.

S. B. B.

THE ECONOMICS OF ROAD TRANSPORT

By K. G. Fenelon, M.A. 256 pages. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925.) Library No. 355.25.

The author of this book, K. G. Fenelon, M. A., is a lecturer on Economics at the University of Edinburgh.

The principal subjects covered are: Types of vehicles, their special economic characteristics and advantages for the transport of goods and merchandise; and a general discussion of the problem of road maintenance as affected by heavy motor traffic. These subjects are covered in a very general way and nothing in their treatment indicates that this book can, because of the author's experience in the subjects on which he writes, be considered a primary source.

The book is not considered to be of any military value.

G. W. S.

IV. NEW TRANSLATIONS FILED IN INSTRUCTORS' FILE ROOM

From the French

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF WAR

By General Camon, French Army. 112 pages (typed). 47 sketches.
Instructors' File No. 1430-A.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS BY THE FRENCH 6TH CAVALRY DIVISION AT THE GRAND RHONE VALLEY MANEUVERS (11-18 SEPTEMBER, 1923)

By X. Instructors' File No. 1320-AA.

FRENCH PROVISIONAL FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS (INSTRUC- TION PROVISoire SUR LE SERVICE EN CAMPAGNE 1924) (Annex No. 1 to "*Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units.*")

By French War Dept. 219 pages (typed).

THE MOTORIZED LIGHT DIVISION

By General Boullaire. 47 pages (typed). Translated from an article
in *Revue Militaire Française*, April-June, 1924. Instructors' File No. 890-B.

ON CODES (CIPHERS)

By Col. Givierge. 96 pages (written). Translated from "*Questions de
Chiffre*," an article in *Revue Militaire Française*, June and July, 1924. In-
structors' File No. 350-A.

V. NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

General Subjects

UNITED STATES CATALOGUE SUPPLEMENT, JULY, 1924-JUNE, 1925

(Summary of books and pamphlets published in the United States.) 777 pages. (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1925.) Library No. 011.

BIRTH, STILLBIRTH, AND INFANT MORTALITY STATISTICS (1923)

By Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 263 pages. (Washington: Gov't Printing Office, 1925.) Library No. 310.

UNITED STATES POLO ASSOCIATION YEAR BOOK (1925)

Edited by J. Richards Vidmer. Library No. 797.

GENERAL ORDERS AND BULLETINS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
1924

Library No. 355.30.

Art of War

LES LOIS ÉTERNELLES DE LA GUERRE—L'OEUVRE DU GÉNÉRAL
DE MIRIBEL—(THE ETERNAL LAWS OF WAR—THE WORK
OF GENERAL DE MIRIBEL)

By Gen. Arthur Boucher. See p. 39.

LES LOIS ÉTERNELLES DE LA GUERRE—LES DOCTRINES DANS
LA PRÉPARATION DE LA GRANDE GUERRE—(THE ETERNAL
LAWS OF WAR—THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE
PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT WAR)

By Gen. Arthur Boucher. French text, 257 pages. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925.) Library No. 358.

General Staff

INSTRUCTION SUR L'ORGANISATION ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT
DES ÉTATS-MAJOR EN CAMPAGNE—(INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF GENERAL STAFFS
IN CAMPAIGN)

By French War Dept. See p. 35.

Combined Tactics

INSTRUCTION PROVISOIRE DUR LE SERVICE EN CAMPAGNE— (PROVISIONAL FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS)

Annex No. 1 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 200 pages. (Paris: L. Fournier.) Library No. 357.01.

INSTRUCTION PROVISOIRE SUR L'ORGANISATION ET LE FONC- TIONNEMENT DE LA LIAISON ET DES TRANSMISSIONS— (PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF LIAISON AND TRANSMISSIONS)

Annex No. 2 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 149 pages. (Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault.) Library No. 357.0.

INSTRUCTION PROVISOIRE SUR L'ORGANISATION DU TERRAIN— (PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE TERRAIN)

Annex No. 3 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 78 pages. (Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 1925.) Library No. 357.0.

L'IMPIECO DELLA DIVISIONE NEL COMBATTIMENTO—(THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION IN COMBAT)

Official textbook, Italian War College 2d Year's Course in Tactics. By Col. Claudis Trezzani, Italian Army. Italian text, 428 pages. (Sten Grafica, Torino, 1924.) Library No. 357.

Logistics

HISTORY OF THE TRANSPORT SERVICE

By Vice-Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. Navy. 344 pages. (New York: George H. Doran Co.) Library No. 359.

THE ECONOMICS OF ROAD TRANSPORT

By K. G. Fenelon, See p. 39.

INSTRUCTION PROVISOIRE SUR L'ORGANISATION DES COM- MUNICATIONS ET DES TRANSPORTS MILITAIRES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE—(PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OR- GANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES IN TIME OF WAR)

Annex No. 6 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 58 pages. (Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 1922.) Library No. 357.0.

Intelligence

INSTRUCTION PROVISOIRE SUR LA RECHERCHE ET L'INTERPRETATION DES RENSEIGNEMENTS—(PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE RESEARCH AND INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION)

Annex No. 4 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 28 pages. (Paris: L. Fournier.) Library No. 357.2.

INSTRUCTION GENERALE SUR L'OBSERVATION (INSTRUCTION PROVISOIRE)—(GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBSERVATION—PROVISIONAL)

Annex No. 5 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 84 pages. (Paris: L. Fournier, 1923.) Library No. 357.0.

Separate Branches—Infantry

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT (4 VOLUMES IN 7 BOOKS)

Vol. I, Parts 1, 2, & 3; Tactics: Vol. II, Parts 1 & 2; Technique: Vol. III; Weapons: Vol. IV; Training. Library No. 358.11.

CE QU'IL FAUT SAVOIR DE L'INFANTERIE—(WHAT SHOULD BE KNOWN OF THE INFANTRY)

By Lt. Col. Br. M. Abadie, French Infantry. French text, 205 pages. (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Co., 1925.) Library No. 357.11.

Artillery

GIBERNES D'ARTILLEUR—(ANALYTICAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE ARTILLERIST) (VOL. III)

By Col. Edmond Cambuzat, French Army. French text, 289 pages. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925.) Library No. 357.30.

Air Service

WINGED DEFENSE

By William Mitchell, former Ass't Chief of Air Force, U.S.A. 251 pages. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925.) Library No. 358.17.

AIRCRAFT OF THE WORLD

By Maj. F. A. de V. Robertson. See p. 38.

ROYAL AIR FORCE FIELD SERVICE POCKET BOOK

British Air Ministry Publication. 314 pages. (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1925.) Library No. 358.17.

LE DEFENSE CONTRE AERONEFS—(ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE)

Official textbook, French Air Service School at Versailles. French text, 54 pages. (1924.) Library No. 358.17.

RÉSUMÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE L'AERONAUTIQUE—(A RÉSUMÉ OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES)

Official textbook, French Air Service School at Versailles. French text, 94 pages. (1924.) Library No. 358.17.

Chemical Warfare

INSTRUCTION PROVISoire SUR LA PROTECTION CONTRE LES GAZ DE COMBAT—(PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANTIGAS PROTECTION)

Annex No. 7 to Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. (French.) 62 pages. (Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 1924.) Library No. 357.0.

Tanks

DIE SCHWEREN FRANZOESISCHEN TANKS—DIE ITALIENISCHEN TANKS—(THE FRENCH HEAVY TANKS—THE ITALIAN TANKS)

By Fritz Heigl, Engineer. (Formerly Captain, Austrian Army.) German text, 68 pages, 19 sketches. (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1925.) Library No. 355.49.

Signal Corps

SIGNALS 1924-1925

By Signal School, U. S. Army, Camp Alfred Vail, N. J. Library No. 355.758.

ELEMENTS OF CRYPTANALYSIS (TRAINING PAMPHLET No. 3)

Official Publication, Chief Signal Office. 157 pages. (Washington: Gov't Printing Office, 1924.) Library No. 358.15.

Military Police

FELDGENDARMERIE ORDNUNG—(MILITARY POLICE REGULATIONS)

By German War Dept. German text, 59 pages. (Berlin: Mittler & Son, 1890.) Library No. 358.192.

GENDARMERIE—SERVICE EN CAMPAGNE—(MILITARY POLICE—SERVICE IN CAMPAIGN)

By French War Dept. French text, 232 pages. (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Co.) Library No. 358.192.

Naval

OUR NAVY AT WAR

By Josephus Daniels. 390 pages. (New York: George H. Doran.) Library No. 359.

Military History and Biography

LIFE OF ADMIRAL MAHAN

By Charles Carlisle Taylor. 359 pages. (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1920.) Library No. 923.

OUR THREE ADMIRALS (FARRAGUT, PORTER, DEWEY)

By James E. Homans. 93 pages. (New York: James T. White & Co., 1899.) Library No. 923.

MEMOIRS OF FORTY-EIGHT YEARS' SERVICE

By Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. 501 pages. (London: John Murray, 1925.) Library No. 923.

MEMOIRS OF A NAPOLEONIC OFFICER

By Jean-Baptiste Barrès. See p. 33.

World War

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, LOGISTICS, REPORTS (7 VOLS.)

Vol. I: Report of Commanding General S.O.S. to the Commander-in-Chief. 330 pages (typed). Vols. II & III: *Appendix A* to Report of Commanding General S.O.S. to the Commander-in-Chief: Report of General Booth Board. Vol. II—Contents: Reports from: (1) Transportation Corps; (2) Chemical Warfare Service; (3) Motor Transport Corps; (4) Engineer Department; (5) Army Service Corps. Vol. III—Contents: Reports from: (1) Signal Corps; (2) Quartermaster Corps; (3) Ordnance Department; (4) Renting, Requisition, and Claims; (5) Chief Surgeon. Vol. IV—*Appendix B* to Report of Commanding General S.O.S. to the Commander-

in-Chief: Report of General Booth Board; Contents: Reports of Embarkation Camps: (1) St. Nazaire; (2) Brest; (3) Bordeaux. Vol. V—*Appendix C* and *Appendix D* to Report of General Booth Board. *Appendix C*—Contents: Report of the Functioning of the General Intermediate Storage Depot at Gievres. *Appendix D*—Contents: Special Reports from: (1) Chemical Warfare Service; (2) Motor Transport Corps; (3) Transportation Corps; (4) Signal Corps; (5) Quartermaster Corps; (6) Medical Department; (7) Engineer Department; (8) Ordnance Department. Vol. VI—*Appendix E* and *Appendix F* to Report of General Booth Board. *Appendix E*—Contents: Report of 1st Replacement Depot at St. Aignan. *Appendix F*—Contents: Organization Charts of each Service and Section. Vol. VII—*Appendix G* to Report of Commanding General S.O.S. to the Commander-in-Chief; Contents: Report of General Booth Board on Origin of S.O.S. and its Relations with G.H.Q.; History of Base Section No. 5; Bordeaux Embarkation Camp; Miscellaneous Data. Library No. 940.3232.

LA GRANDE GUERRE SUR LE FRONT OCCIDENTAL—(THE GREAT WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONT) (VOL. XI: THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME)

By Gen. Palat, French Army. French text, 416 pages, 3 maps. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925.) Library No. 940.4.

TANNENBERG—THE FIRST THIRTY DAYS IN EAST PRUSSIA

By Maj. Gen. Sir Edmund Ironside. 306 pages, 14 maps and sketches. (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1925.) Library No. 940.4.

THE DEFENSE OF IVANGOROD IN 1914-1915

From the Memoirs of de Schwarz. See p. 18.

AUFMARSCH NACH ZWEI FRONTEN AUF GRUND DER OPERATIONSPLANE VON 1841-1914—(THE CONCENTRATION ON TWO FRONTS BASED ON THE PLANS OF OPERATIONS FROM 1871 TO 1914)

By H. von Staabs. See p. 36.

ARMY BEHIND THE ARMY

By Maj. E. Alexander Powell. 470 pages. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919.) Library No. 358.

Russo-Japanese War

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

By "Footslogger." See p. 33.

General History

THE CHALLENGE OF ASIA

By Stanley Rice. 250 pages. (London: John Murray, 1925.) Library No. 950.

July-September, 1925

Law

STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1924-1925
(in 2 parts).

(Washington: Gov't Printing Office, 1925.) Library No. 340.

FEDERAL REPORTER (2D SERIES, VOL. 3)

(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1925.) Library No. 340.

SESSION OF LAWS OF KANSAS, 1925

(Topeka, Kans.: Hon. F. J. Ryan, Sec'y of State.) Library No. 340

REVISED STATUTES OF KANSAS, 1923

(Topeka, Kans.: Hon. F. J. Ryan, Sec'y of State.) Library No. 340.

Languages

GERMAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (VOLS. 3 & 4)

By Murat-Sanders, Berlin-Choneberg. Library No. 433.

VI. MAGAZINES RECEIVED

United States

Weeklies:

Army and Navy Journal.
Army and Navy Register.
Engineering News-Record.
Federal Reporter.
Literary Digest.
Saturday Evening Post.
The Outlook.
Time.

Semi-Monthlies:

American Rifleman.
Recruiting News.
Rider and Driver.
The Pointer.

Monthlies:

Aero Digest.
Bulletin of the Pan American Union.
Coast Artillery Journal.
Chemical Warfare.
Current History.
Historical Outlook.
Infantry Journal.
International Book Review.
Military Surgeon.
National Geographic.
Review of Reviews.
Scientific American.
Scientific Monthly.
The Bookman.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
Western Golfer (Presented).
World's Work.

Bi-Monthlies:

Army Ordnance.
Field Artillery Journal.
Military Engineer.
Quartermaster Review.
The Annals.

Quarterlies:

Americana.
American Journal of International Law.
American Historical Review.
Cavalry Journal.
Foreign Affairs.

Geographical Review.
Journal of American History.
Marine Corps Journal.
North American Review.
The Remount.
The Spur.
Yale Review.

England

Weeklies:

Army, Navy, and Air Force Gazette.
London Illustrated News.

Monthlies:

Royal Artillery Journal.
Tank Corps Journal.

Quarterlies:

Army Quarterly.
Cavalry Journal.
Round Table.
Royal Engineers Journal.
Royal United Service Institution.

France

Weeklies:

L'Illustration.

Semi-Monthlies:

Revue de Paris.

Monthlies:

Revue d'Artillerie.
Revue d'Infanterie.
Revue Militaire Française.

Bi-Monthlies:

Revue de Cavalerie.

Germany

Weeklies:

Militär-Wochenblatt.

Monthlies:

Heerestechnik.

Quarterlies:

Wissen und Wehr.

Italy

Monthlies:

La Cooperazione Delle Armi.

Spain

Monthlies:

La Guerra y su Preparacion.

Belgium

Monthlies:

Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires.

Switzerland

Monthlies:

Revue Militaire Suisse.

Canada

Semi-Monthlies:

Military Gazette.

Cuba

Monthlies:

Boletin del Ejercito.

VII. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED IN INSTRUCTORS' FILE ROOM

FROM THE CAVALRY SCHOOL

	<i>Instructors' File No.</i>
<i>Animal Management—Anatomy and Physiology and their Relation to the Use of the Army Horse. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-4
<i>Animal Management—Digestive Tract and Its Relation to Health and Disease of the Horse. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-5
<i>Animal Management—Respiratory Tract and Skin. Function and Relation to Health. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-6
<i>Armored Cars.—Armored Cars with Cavalry. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-10
<i>Assignments of Officers in the Advanced Class to Squads. Memorandum</i>	P.H. 93-13
<i>Assignments of Officers in the Troop Officer's Class to Platoons. Memorandum</i>	P.H. 93-14
<i>Characteristics of Machine Guns. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 174-2
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Advanced Class, Sept., 1925</i>	P.H. 93-1
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Advanced N.G. & R.O. Class, Sept., 1925</i>	P.H. 93-2
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Refresher Course, July, 1925</i>	P.H. 93-3
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Refresher Course, August, 1925</i>	P.H. 93-4
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Special Adv. Equitation Class, Sept., 1925</i>	P.H. 93-5
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Troop Officers' Course, Sept., 1925</i>	P.H. 93-6
<i>Consolidated Schedule, Troop Officers' N.G. & R.O. Course, Sept., 1925</i>	P.H. 93-7
<i>Estimate of the Situation. (Illustrative Problem.) Conference</i>	P.H. 93-18
<i>Estimate of the Situation. Map Exercise</i>	P.H. 93-17
<i>Form for Unit Mobilization Plan. National Guard. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 174-12
<i>Form for Unit Mobilization Plan. Organized Reserves. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 174-11
<i>General Principles of Liaison. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-7
<i>Instruments. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 174-3
<i>Liaison. Radio. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-9
<i>Liaison. Wire Communication. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-8
<i>Methods of Instruction. Introduction. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-16
<i>Methods of Instruction. Application and Examination. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-15
<i>Methods of Instruction. General Principles of Teaching. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-13
<i>Methods of Instruction. Preparation and Presentation. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-14
<i>Mobilization Plans. The Army of the United States and General Mobilization Plans. Conference</i>	P.H. 174-17
<i>Offensive Combat Cavalry vs. Infantry. Demonstration</i>	P.H. 93-16
<i>Other Arms—Field Artillery. Pamphlet</i>	P.H. 174-1
<i>Riot Duty. Examination</i>	P.H. 93-15
<i>Schedule of Instruction. Advanced Course</i>	P.H. 93-8
<i>Schedule of Instruction. Advanced Course N.G. & R.O.</i>	P.H. 93-9
<i>Schedule of Instruction. Special Advanced Equitation Course</i>	P.H. 93-12
<i>Schedule of Instruction. Troop Officers' Course</i>	P.H. 93-10
<i>Schedule of Instruction. Troop Officers' Course, N.G. & R.O.</i>	P.H. 93-11

CHEMICAL WARFARE SCHOOL

<i>Outline of the Line and Staff Officers' Course</i>	P.H. 16-12
<i>Weekly Schedule</i>	P.H. 16-1

COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL

General Analytical Outline for Preparation and Presentation of a Lecture.....	P.H. 12-2
General Conferences.—Outline, Purpose, etc.....	P.H. 12-1
Notes on Public Speaking. Lecture.....	P.H. 148-27

MISCELLANEOUS

Elements of Cryptanalysis. Prepared in Office of the Chief Signal Officer. Pamphlet.....	P.H. 38-3
Chemical Warfare Bulletin. August, 1925. Pamphlet.....	P.H. 76-25
Tactical Employment Against Naval Targets of Tractor Drawn Coast Artillery sited outside of Harbor Defenses. Training Regulations No. 435-26, Coast Artillery Corps.....	P.H. 148-26

VIII. SUBJECT INDEX

AIR SERVICE

General

ADMIRAL SIMS SAYS "AIRCRAFT DOOMS BATTLESHIPS." By W. F. Fullam, Rear Admiral, U.S.N. (Ret.).—*Aero Digest*, Sept., 1925. p. 462.

AIRCRAFT OF THE WORLD. By de V. Robertson. See p. 38.

WILL AIRPLANES END WAR? By Gen. Peppino Garibaldi.—*Aero Digest*, Aug., 1925, p. 411. 2 pages.

British

GIBRALTAR SHORN OF STRENGTH. By Davis Edwards.—*Aero Digest*, Sept., 1925, p. 474. 2 pages.

ROYAL AIR FORCE FIELD SERVICE POCKET BOOK. British Air Ministry publication. 314 pages. Library No. 358.17.

THE WAR IN THE AIR. (VOL. I). By Raleigh. See p. 38.

Hawaii

AIRCRAFT'S IMPORTANT RÔLE AT HAWAII. By W. R. Chellgard.—*Aero Digest*, Sept., 1925, p. 471. 2 pages.

Iraq

THE AIR FORCE IN IRAQ. (Lecture.) By Air Marshal Sir John Salmond.—*Jour. Royal United Service Inst.*, Aug., 1925, p. 483. 16 pages.

Italy

REORGANIZATION OF THE AIR SERVICE. (Mil. Notes on Foreign Armies, by Mil. Intelligence Div., G.S.)—*Inf. Jour.*, Sept., 1925, p. 354.

United States

DANIEL GUGGENHEIM SAYS "WE MUST NOT LET AIR SUPREMACY SLIP." By Edward Marshal.—*Aero Digest*, Aug., 1925, p. 407. 3 pages.

ANTITANK DEFENSE

KAMPFWAGEN UND ABWEHR DAGEGEN—(TANKS AND ANTITANK DEFENSE). By Lieut. Volckheim, German Army.—*Wissen und Wehr*, June, 1925, p. 309. German text, 12 pages.

ARMIES

General

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